Naval Conflict During the Wars of the Diadochi 323 – 318 BC.

With the exception of the battle of Salamis (306 BC.), the naval conflicts during the wars of the Diadochi are often overlooked. In an attempt to correct this, here is an overview of the main naval events of the early years of the conflict from 323 to 318 BC. This period saw a number of major naval engagements and these played a decisive role in shaping the course of the wars.

The first major naval clashes took place during the Lamian War. At the outset of this conflict Athens raised a fleet of about 240 ships, although only about 40 were larger than Triremes. This vast investment in a navy tells us how important the Athenians viewed control of the sea. They understood that if they could prevent reinforcements being brought over from Asia, that they stood a real chance of defeating Antipater. As it was, they could not and the successive reverses suffered by the Athenians at sea condemned them to defeat.

Because of the deficiencies of our sources we cannot say for certain if the Lamian War saw two or three naval battles. The following is what I believe was the most likely course of events. In the Spring of 322, the Macedonian admiral Cleitus (the White) engaged the Athenians, commanded by Euetion, off Abydos and won a resounding victory. This handed the Macedonians control of the sea and meant they could bring Antipater reinforcements unhindered.

Cleitus might have fought another Athenian squadron in the Malian Gulf not long afterwards. If so, it would suggest that the force he defeated at Abydos was not the entire Athenian fleet of 240 (yet it is accepted that the fleet at Abydos consisted of the bulk of Athenian naval power). Athens immediately outfitted a new fleet, an incredible effort, and prepared for another confrontation. They probably managed to re-equip and build a force of around 170 ships. In the summer of 322, probably July, Cleitus met Euetion again in a decisive battle off the Amorgos Islands. The Athenian fleet was destroyed and signaled the end of Athenian naval power. It also marked the end of Greek hopes and handed the Macedonians victory in the war. The Greek allies did hazard another pitched battle on land, at Crannon, in September 322. However the situation at sea meant that nothing less than a knock-out victory would save them. They fought the Macedonians to a standstill, but it was not enough.

What undid the Greeks was their reliance on the Black Sea trade routes for food to feed their people. Cleitus' victories allowed the Macedonians to blockade Greece and slowly begin to strangle the Greek war effort. For this reason the Amorgos Islands spelt the effective end for the Athenians. The question does have to be asked, why was Euetion allowed a second command after his first defeat off Abydos? This is not to suggest another admiral would have done better, but considering how in the past Athenian admirals were often blamed for the loss of citizen lives, even when they won, it is surprising that Euetion was not replaced. Perhaps the Athenians realised that in Cleitus they faced a skilled commander and that only an experienced man stood any chance?

We know little enough about the ships used in this period. Diodorus tells us the Athenians built 200 triremes and 40 quadriremes (Justin says only 200 ships in total). No figures are given for the Macedonian fleet. Cleitus, one of Alexander's men, probably commanded a mixed force of Macedonian, Cypriot and Phoenician ships. We know that within about ten years of this period Antigonus had begun commissioning much larger ships to be built in Syria and Phoenicia, so it is not unreasonable to suppose that the Macedonian fleet not only outnumbered the Athenian fleet, but that it had significantly more big ships. Athens had a proud record at sea, but surely nothing demonstrated more clearly that the age of the city state was done than the mismatch in naval power and technology now displayed.

Cleitus, and his fleet, seem to have stayed attached to Antipater at this point and sided with him against Perdiccas as the next phase of the conflict began. However his was not the only fleet and so when invading Egypt, Perdiccas took a fleet of unknown size with him, commanded by his brother-in-law, Attalus. After Perdiccas' murder, Attalus fled with his fleet to Tyre where he collected men and money. Joining with Alcetas, Perdiccas' brother, they launched an attack on Rhodes (probably in 320). This was defeated by the Rhodian admiral, Demaratus. W. W. Tarn speculates that Attalus may also have attacked Cyprus, but that this invasion was defeated by Cleitus and the Athenian admiral, Thymochares (notice the Athenian navy had now been reduced to a support role). If so this would confirm that Cleitus was allied with Antipater, or at least that he recognised him as the legitimate Regent of the Empire.

This is an important distinction. Because after Antipater's death Cleitus sided with Polyperchon against Cassander, Antipater's son. Cleitus' control of the sea was vital to Polyperchon's hopes of defeating Cassander, as the latter was depending upon Antigonus sending him help from Asia. If Cleitus could prevent Antigonus crossing to Europe, Cassander's war effort would be severely hit.

Cleitus engaged Nicanor, who was allied to Cassander and Antigonus, in a naval battle off Byzantium in the summer of 318. If we accept all of the above this would be Cleitus fifth naval engagement and, not surprisingly, his knowledge of naval combat proved too much for Nicanor, winning him the battle. From 130 ships, Cleitus succeeded in capturing or sinking 60. This should have been decisive, but Antigonus arrived and, with the connivance of the Byzantines, launched a surprise attack by land and sea the following day. Caught in their camp, just as the Athenians had been at Aegospotami almost a century ago, Cleitus' forces were swiftly captured or destroyed. Cleitus himself escaped, only to fall into the hands of Lysimachus who had him killed.

This battle off Byzantium effectively brought the first period of naval combat in the wars of the Diadochi to an end. In the succeeding years the main trend, in a naval sense, was Ptolemy's growing power. Finally to counter this, Antigonus ordered a massive shipbuilding program which would eventually result in the decisive battle of Salamis (306) handing Demetrius control of the Eastern Mediterranean for a generation.

Alexander's Strategy After Issus.

The battle of Issus (333 B.C.) witnessed the destruction of Darius III's western army. Alexander now, realistically, was faced with two choices. Should he pursue Darius into Mesopotamia, or continue his policy of conquering the Asiatic coast to deny the Persians access to the sea? Obviously he chose the later, but here we shall try to understand why.

As he fled East, Darius doubtless expected to look back at any moment to find Alexander pursuing him. But Alexander had decided that following Darius into the depths of Asia was, for the moment, not a good idea. He cannot have known in the aftermath of Issus where Darius was going or what he planned. What he will have known is that the Persian Empire still possessed great reserves of manpower in the East. And this was a real threat to Alexander, particularly as the situation in the West was still in flux. The last thing Alexander needed was to move inland while potentially dangerous forces remained to his rear, particularly as Darius might retreat to the mountains and wage a guerilla campaign which might take years to subdue.

The Persians had suffered a shattering defeat, but they still possessed significant forces in the west. Of chief importance, and the greatest threat to Alexander's fledgling empire, was the fleet which was operating in the Aegean. The commanders Pharnabazus and Autophradates had been charged with provoking and supporting rebellion on the Greek mainland, under the leadership of Sparta, and reconquering the Aegean islands and Anatolian coast. Prior to Issus they had made progress, capturing a number of the Greek islands and forcing Alexander to rebuild his navy.

When the news of Issus reached the Persian Admirals they sailed to the coast of Asia Minor to head off the inevitable revolts which news of the battle would provoke. By Spring 332 the fleet had essentially collapsed, the Phoenician and Cypriot ships leaving for home. If Alexander had not moved south along the coast would these troops have abandoned the Persian cause? The fleet had caused Alexander a great deal of trouble, but no longer. After the capture of Tyre, the Macedonians, with their new Phoenician and Cypriot allies were the masters of the Eastern Mediterranean.

A large body of troops had fled from Issus to the north and linked up with Persian forces in Anatolia. These represented a real threat to Macedonian control of the region, which at this point was by no means assured. Alexander kept faith in Antigonus to deal with the situation. He did so, but it took three pitched battles and over a year of fighting to defeat these Persian loyalists. While our sources, obsessed as they are with Alexander, have paid scant attention to these events, the situation in Anatolia seems to have been fairly serious. Alexander, not blessed with hindsight, would have been well aware that this region must be pacified in order to assure the success of his future campaigns. The news that Antigonus had finally crushed the resistance must have been welcome indeed.

Another group of mercenaries fled from Issus to Cyprus. From here, Amyntas, a Macedonian fugitive, led some of them to Egypt with the aim of annexing the country. This was a canny bit of opportunism on Amyntas part. As Ptolemy was to prove later, Egypt, when properly defended, was a daunting natural fortress. If Amyntas had been successful, it would have proven hard to dislodge him. Some historians have questioned the wisdom of Alexander pushing into Egypt, after subduing Phoenicia. What they seem to have misunderstood is that, if Alexander had not taken the province when he did, if he had let Amyntas, or some other commander, dig himself in and use the provinces wealth to hire a mercenary army, he might never have captured it. Indeed, as Ptolemy again proves, a capable ruler in Egypt was well placed to attack Phoenicia and dominate the Eastern Mediterranean. Fortunately for Alexander, Amyntas was defeated and killed by the Persian troops stationed in Egypt. Amyntas' defeat seems to have rested more on the indiscipline of his troops rather than the skill of the Persian garrison who, later, surrendered to Alexander. But a year or two down the line, and with effective leadership, the situation may have been very different. Moreover, Alexander was already thinking in terms of establishing himself as master of Asia. For this reason also he was unwilling to leave Egypt's future in the hands of fate.

While it may seem that Alexander had a choice of strategy after Issus, I would contest that this was illusionary and that circumstance dictated precisely which course he had to follow. The need to deal with the various Persian forces still active in the West and to bring the coastal provinces securely under his control, in order to advance his claim to legitimate kingship, out weighed by far any desire to pursue Darius.

Who was Cratesipolis?

Ancient history is full of obscure characters who are often over-looked in the rush to talk about Alexander, Caesar etc. This is a real shame as some of history's minor characters lead fascinating lives and studying them can often shed new light on well-worn topics.

Take the case of Cratesipolis, a rather remarkable woman who lived at the end of the 4^th century BC. We know almost nothing about her, not even her real name (Cratesipolis roughly means 'conqueror of the city', which was probably not a common name for little girls, even in the ancient world). Yet the picture which emerges from the scant few references to her is of a complex and brilliant individual, one capable of capitalising on the chaos and uncertainty of her age and coming out on top.

Cratesipolis was the wife of Alexander, the son of Polyperchon. This is the same Polyperchon who, upon the death of Antipater in 319 BC, was appointed Regent of Alexander the Great's vast empire. This provoked civil war as Cassander, Antipater's son, and Antigonus Monophthalmus, the governor of Greater Phrygia, both felt they should have been given the position. Polyperchon allied himself with Eumenes of Cardia and Olympias, Alexander the Great's mother. The complicated nature of the conflict which ensued is unimportant, suffice to say after the defeats and deaths of Olympias and Eumenes, Polyperchon was rather isolated.

His cause had all but collapsed, yet, he and his son, Alexander, still controlled much of the Peloponnesus, including some important strongholds. Both were courted by the more powerful warlords (the Diadochi) of the time who sought them as allies. Polyperchon and Alexander sided with Antigonus against Cassander at first, but Alexander changed sides having made a deal with Cassander.

Cratesipolis enters the historical record sometime in 314 BC. Plutarch, in his life of Demetrius Poliorcetes, describes Cratesipolis as, 'a famous beauty'. In this year her husband, Alexander, was murdered, as he was preparing to leave Sicyon with his army, by one of those civic patriots Greece once so commonly produced, Alexion of Sicyon. It seems some deceit was involved as Diodorus reports that Alexion pretended to be Alexander's friend.

Sicyon had been garrisoned by Alexander's troops and there can be little doubt he essentially ruled it in the manner of a tyrant. Alexion felt he was liberating his city as he struck down the Macedonian general. However he had reckoned without Cratesipolis. She was, according to Diodorus, skilled in practical matters and an extremely daring woman. Also, she was well regarded by her husband's men for her various acts of kindness and charity. Unfortunately for Sicyon and Alexion there was little kindness or charity in what followed.

While the people of Sicyon perhaps saw Alexander's death as the signal to regain their freedom, Cratesipolis had other ideas. She drew up her husband's troops against the citizens and defeated them with great slaughter. She had about thirty men arrested, doubtless those she considered responsible for the revolt and her husband's death, and had them crucified. After a bloody day's combat Sicyon was now ruled by a woman.

At some point she gained control of Corinth as well. Probably the garrison there was loyal to her husband, indeed it may well have been his headquarters. Cratesipolis controlled these two cities from 314 – 308 BC, all the while still, it would seem, maintaining her husbands alliance with Cassander.

However in 308 BC, Ptolemy showed up and began to meddle in the affairs of the Peloponnesus. He made contact with Cratesipolis and the two of them seem to have struck a deal. Cratesipolis agreed to hand Sicyon and Corinth over to Ptolemy and retire to private life.

The people of Corinth had other ideas and objected to a Ptolmaic garrison so Cratesipolis was forced to resort to deception. She told the Corinthians that she intended to resist Ptolemy and that she had sent to Sicyon for reinforcements. Secretly she informed Ptolemy of this plan and he dispatched a force which appeared before Corinth and pretended to be Cratesipolis's men. They were welcomed into the city and managed to bloodlessly seize power.

This was a major coup for Ptolemy. Corinth occupied a key strategic location in the Peloponnesus and its fortress was one of the mightiest in Greece. We are not told what Cratesipolis got from Ptolemy for this service but it seems likely she was well rewarded. Cratesipolis retired to Patrae (Modern Patras).

She was still there in 307 BC when Demetrius Poliorcetes captured Athens from Cassander and restored its democratic constitution. Such was her reputation for beauty that Demetrius abandoned his army in Megara and and travelled cross country with only a few attendants in the hope of affecting a meeting with her. The way Plutarch tells it, Demetrius pitched his tent a discrete distance from his bodyguards to allow Cratesipolis to come and go without being seen and preserve her modesty. However some of his enemies got wind of this meeting and launched a surprise attack on the camp. Demetrius scarcely had time to snatch up his cloak and run before they were on him. He barely escaped.

So much for that. However a more cynical assessment of situation may be that Cratesipolis was again applying her powers of deception. Had she perhaps arranged the meeting with Demetrius in the hopes of betraying him to Ptolemy? How else would these attackers just happen to know where the meeting place was to be? Perhaps this is just speculation, but it does not seem out of character.

Sadly though, with that, Cratesipolis vanishes from the historical record. We know nothing else of her or what became of her. This is a shame as the woman who is briefly revealed to us is fascinating. Just how did she gain control of her husbands troops and prevent them from merely offering their services to Cassander or Antigonus? How effective was her rule over Sicyon and Corinth? What exactly was her relationship with the great men of the time, with Cassander, Ptolemy and Demetrius?

We can make guesses at the above questions, but frustratingly we will never know for sure. When even simple questions such as who she was and where she came from elude us we cannot hope to draw in-depth conclusions. But her small cameo does help shed some light on the chaotic and often confusing wars of the successors. Her willingness to change sides was not unusual. Many did likewise, offering their services to the general who paid the highest or was thought most likely to win. Further her very success demonstrates what was possible in a world in flux. The old certainties had dissolved and it was now possible for a woman to play a decisive role in events, to hold great wealth and independent means, even to lead soldiers.

It could be argued that if her husband had not died we may not have heard of her, perhaps she would have continued quietly in the background. But he did and she seized her opportunity to, briefly, place herself centre stage in Greek history.

Further Reading: Diodorus Siculus: XIX.67 & XX.37, Polyaenus: VIII.58, Plutarch: Life of Demetrius.

The Image at the top of the page is of a statue of Athena and can be found in the Louvre.