When did Vandal Sea-power Develop?

It is generally accepted that after the Vandals, led by Geiseric (reigned 428 AD – 477 AD), captured Carthage in 439 AD they gained possession of a fleet based there and began making piratical raids throughout the Mediterranean. These were spectacularly successful and climaxed in the sack of Rome (455 AD), the conquest of Sicily, Sardinia and a fair proportion of North Africa. While these is no question that controlling Carthage and the naval yards there were vital to Vandal success, did the Vandals begin to develop these tactics before 439 AD?

Before looking at the evidence it is worth considering the sources available to us. The Vandals have not been treated well by the progress of ages. No source remains written from their point of view, and what little is said about them comes from the Roman perspective. Often the sources can be outright hostile to the Vandals and many are fragmentary, providing little in the way of detail.

The chronicler Hydatius (c.400 – c.469 AD, Bishop of Aquae Flaviae in Hispania) is of central importance to this discussion. It is generally accepted that his work is reasonably trustworthy regarding Spanish affairs. He listed events, from the Fifth century and mostly relating to Spain, in chronological order, one after the other. His entry for 425 AD is fascinating. He wrote, “The Vandals pillaged the Balearic Islands and when they had sacked Cartagena and Seville, and pillaged Spain, they invaded Mauritania.” This makes for an action packed year and the final part of the statement has been taken by some Historians to imply that the Vandals began raiding Mauritania (Western North Africa) in 425 AD.

But first we should consider, to attack the Balearic Islands and Mauritania would require ships. So it seems a reasonable assumption that the Vandals began to become acquainted with the sea back in 425 AD. However an alternative interpretation of Hydatius presents a slightly different picture and makes dating these events more difficult. In a later entry, dated to 428 AD, Hydatius tells us that Gunderic (reigned 407 – 428 AD), Geiseric's predecessor, died after his men violated the sanctity of a church in Seville. The looting of a church would doubtless only occur after the city fell so it is reasonable to assume that Seville was captured in 428 AD, not 425 AD. If we accept this then we can assume that Hydatius' statement of 425 AD related not to events in that year but was a list of everything which happened from 425 AD till the Vandals crossed to Africa and left Spain.

So does Hydatius statement concerning the invasion of Mauritania refer to Vandal raids on North Africa before 429 AD or merely to the crossing of that year? Its difficult to answer. A reasonable reconstruction of events would be that, the Vandals, having reached the Spanish coast besieged and captured Cartagena and, having obtained ships there, then pillaged the Balearic Islands. Seville may have fallen next (although Hydatius is not clear, maybe Seville fell first) and then, after the accession of Geiseric, the Vandals would have invaded Mauritania. This sequence, although tentative, seems plausible. The Vandals, as they proved at Hippo Regis, were pretty ineffective at besieging cities (it took them thirteen months to take Hippo in 431) and so it seems reasonable to assume they would be unable to capture both Cartagena and Seville in one year.

Whenever it occurred, the raid on the Balearic Islands proves that the Vandals possessed ships, at least in limited numbers, from as early as c.425 AD onwards. It is impossible to tell if these were ships they captured in Cartagena or merely ships they took possession of once they reached the Spanish coast.

It is unlikely, though, that it was the Vandals themselves who suddenly developed an affinity for sailing. The Vandal 'supergroup' was a tribe of many nationalities and peoples. Vandals (two different tribes), Alans, Goths and even Romans were all members. It is probable that locals with specialised sailing skills were recruited into the tribe. Whether this was voluntary or compulsory is unknown.

When the Vandals crossed from Spain to Africa it is likely they had their own ships. Some Historians have speculated that the local Hispanic population wanted them gone and so offered their services in this matter. This is possible and the Vandals having their own ships would not negate this theory. Once across the Vandals marched along the North African coast. A small fleet of ships would prove useful here to carry water, food and sundry supplies and injured or unfit tribesmen.

By 430 the Vandals were besieging Hippo Regis. Possidius, in his life of St. Augustine, tells us that the city was cut of by land and sea, indicating that the Vandals definitely possessed ships at this point. It seems reasonable to presume that these were the same ships they had taken from Spain.

The next reference to Vandal piratical activity comes from another chronicler named Prosper Tiro. In 437-8 AD a series of attacks were launched on various Mediterranean islands, including Sicily. Prosper describes these raiders as, 'barbarians, runaways of the foederati'. In the treaty of 435 AD the Vandals had been declared allies of Rome, or foederati, suggesting that these pirates were possibly a rogue faction who had left Vandal service and taken some ships with them. They may well, however, have been operating with the blessing of Geiseric. By 437 AD he had begun to take a more aggressive stance against the Romans and had exiled a number of prominent Romans from his territories, including Possidius. Clearly he planned already to violate the treaty he had signed in 435 AD. Unfortunately we can't know for certain. I suspect Geiseric sanctioned the attacks, although may have publicly called the raiders runaways. But this is just guesswork.

Geiseric was soon to reopen hostilities for real. In 439 AD Carthage was stormed and, as mentioned above, by 440 AD the Vandals had begun serious and large scale naval operations against the Western Roman empire. These were wide ranging and would eventually include attacks on the Atlantic seaboard and in the East against Greece and the Islands. The fall of Rome, in 455 AD, was merely the most notorious incident.

But it seems certain that the Vandals did not become salty sea-dogs overnight. Prior to 440 AD there is enough evidence in our fragmentary sources to indicate that Vandals began to become familiar with the sea and the possibilities of piracy as early as 425-8 AD and that they were developing (or recruiting) skills that would serve them well in the years to come. We should not presume that the Vandals actually possessed a major fleet or conceived of its effectiveness before the capture of Carthage. But it is probable that the fall of Cartagena and the raid on the Balearic Islands opened Geiseric's eyes to the advantages of sea power and that the later Vandal kingdom's naval strength had its roots in these events.

Reading: Primary sources on the Vandals are fragmentary and often hard to come by. For this piece I used works by Victor of Vita, Possidius, Hydatius and Prosper Tiro. Procopius also writes about the Vandals in this period and is probably easier to obtain, although I did not use him directly. Secondary sources, in English, have been notoriously bad for dealing with the Vandals for years. Many over look them or get facts wrong. Peter Heather's recent 'The Fall of the Roman Empire' gives a good account of the period.

Count Sebastian, The Roman Pirate.

Sebastian is a shadowy figure in Fifth Century AD history, who operated in the chaotic 430's and 440's. F. M. Clover attempted a chronological outline of Sebastian's career in the paper, 'Count Gainas and Count Sebastian' which appeared in The American Journal of Ancient History, Issue 4, 1979, pp.65-76. I think he more or less got it right, though one might quibble over some of the dates, and I will use his outline to discuss Sebastian's activities.

Sebastian first emerges in the historical record after his father-in-law, Count Boniface, defeated Aetius at the battle of Ravenna (Rimini) in 432 AD. Boniface died soon after from wounds sustained in the battle, leaving Sebastian to succeed him as Comes et Magister Utriusque Militiae (essentially, 'supreme commander') of the Western Empire. Sebastian did not hold this position for long, as very soon after, Aetius returned and, with support from the Huns, seized control of the Western Empire, by 433 AD at the latest.

Fleeing East, Sebastian arrived in Constantinople. What happens next is unclear, but it seems Sebastian wore out his welcome at Court. It has been suggested that Sebastian and his supporters were plotting to overthrow the current regime. Sebastian was forced to flee Constantinople and he and his men began making piratical attacks in the Hellespont and Propontis.

Around this time the seaward defences of Constantinople were improved. Some believe this to be a response to Vandal raids, or at least the threat of raids. However it is wrong to assume that all Mediterranean pirate activity in this period was conducted by the Vandals. We know of at least one other pirate, named Contradis, who was captured and executed in about 438 AD. It seems it was in response to both his threat and that of Sebastian that Constantinople sought to improve its defences. The Vandals did not raid in the East until later.

In Clover's chronology by either 438 or 439, Sebastian and his men had fled West again to the court of Theoderic I, King of the Goths. It is worth noting that Clover's dating here differs from others. The chronicler Hydatius dates Sebastian's arrival in the Gothic court as being 444 AD. However, Clover, to my mind, argues convincingly for the earlier date citing the chronicler Prosper Tiro and linking Sebastian's movements persuasively to contemporary events.

The arrival of Sebastian in Toulouse, along with the fall of Carthage to the Vandals (439) and the subsequent Gothic-Vandal alliance presented Aetius and the Western government with a formidable problem. Aetius marched into Gaul and defeated the Goths in battle, forcing Theoderic to accept a renewal of the treat of 418, which had established the Goths as foederati.

Sebastian and his men were forced to move again, this time to Barcelona which they captured. From here they sailed to Africa, pitching up at the court of Geiseric. This was their last stop as Geiseric eventually had Sebastian executed (the date is uncertain, following Hydatius it was about 450 AD).

The Christian writer Victor of Vita described Sebastian's fall from grace and execution. What is perhaps most remarkable about his account is that he devotes so much time to a man who clearly was not very religious. Every other 'martyr' against the Arian Vandal regime mentioned by Victor has their virtue and piety expressed in detail. Sebastian is referred to as a valiant fighting man, but little is said of his religious belief. It seems Sebastian's death, to Victor at least, was an important event and one worth discussing, even if Sebastian did not conform to the standards of the usual victims of the Vandals.

Victor suggests that Sebastian was extremely popular at court and that Geiseric felt threatened. Whether Sebastian ever stood a realistic chance of seizing control of Carthage and the Vandal state is uncertain. One would suspect not, but if prominent Vandals were beginning to see him as a potential replacement for Geiseric, it would possibly say something about the multi-ethnic nature of the Vandal force. It should be remembered that the Vandal army also contained Alans, Goths and Romans. Even if the Hasdingi and Siling Vandal elite were loyal to Geiseric, there may have been a significant number of commanders from the other minority ethnic-groups who viewed Sebastian as a valid candidate.

Another reason for Geiseric ordering Sebastian's death may be that Aetius demanded it as part of the alliance agreed between the Romans and Vandals. Plausible, but if so why was Sebastian only executed in 450? It is possible that Hydatius' dating is erroneous here and the event took place earlier, or that there may have been another reason altogether for Sebastian's death.

A picture of Sebastian emerges from all of this. He seems to have been a charismatic, daring and dangerous individual who was seen wherever he went as being a potential threat to established regimes. This tells us that even after Aetius deposed him that he still wielded considerable authority and power. Sebastian had a number of troops (bucellarii) with him. The actual numbers may have fluctuated over time but their presence suggests Sebastian had significant resources with which to maintain them.

Once Sebastian was in Constantinople he would have soon found himself in a quandary. To keep his men loyal and attached to him he would require funds, but the Imperial government, one easily imagines, would be reluctant to fund a large, armed fighting force belonging to one so ambitious. Driven out of Constantinople, Sebastian's piracy was probably undertaken not so much as an attack on Constantinople, but as a means to reward his followers and to maintain his household.

The resources of the Eastern Empire were such that Sebastian would soon have realized that continued piracy in the East was very dangerous. Therefore he returned to the West, perhaps with the intention of gaining Gothic support to defeat Aetius and win back his former position. The Gothic defeat put paid to this and so Sebastian moved to Barcelona. This attack was primarily to pillage and reward his soldiers. Sebastian must have realised, however, that his options were running out.

He needed an ally who would support and shelter him or turn a blind eye to any piratical attacks he launched to support himself. Preferably an ally who was opposed to Aetius. There was only one option, Geiseric.

Dr. Clover argues that Sebastian arrived in Carthage around 440 while Geiseric was in Sicily. The Vandals had captured Marsala and were besieging Panormus. No mention is made in the sources of whether Panormus was captured, but their silence hints, to me at least, that the Vandal siege failed. It could be speculated that Geiseric was forced to abandon the siege, or at least curtail it, upon receiving the news that Sebastian and his faction had arrived in Carthage. This forced Geiseric to return to Africa to confront Sebastian.

Clearly an understanding was reached between Geiseric and Sebastian, one which held until Geiseric either decided to remove the threat to his position or was persuaded by Aetius to do him a favour.

Sebastian achieved little during his career and could be described as a mere pirate or brigand. But he was symptomatic of the times. A man such as himself could only operate and, for a time, be successful in an environment where imperial power structures were collapsing. In this power vacuum men like him could wreak havoc, playing competing factions against one-another and preying on those who were left defenceless by Rome's weakness. It is worth remembering that until the defeat of the Goths, Sebastian probably had a real chance of regaining his position and ousting Aetius. Afterwards, however, he was always going to become marginalised and this in turn led to his eventual death.

Reading: Clover, F. M., 'Count Gainas and Count Sebastian', in The American Journal of Ancient History, Issue 4, 1979, pp.65-76. See also Heather, P., The Fall of the Roman Empire, for a good overview of the period. Primary sources are hard to obtain, look for Hydatius, Victor of Vita, Count Marcellinus and Prosper Tiro. All are mentioned in Clover's work.